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The  Commission  decided  on  12  April  1994 {Commission  Decision  94/255/ECSC) to  approve aids 
totalling  437.8 billions  ptas.  under Article 95 ECSC, serving the following  purposes : 
Capital  injection of 276.7 billions ptas. 
Social  aid  up to 54.519 billions  ptas. 
Up to 35.5 billions  ptas.in the form of a capital conversion of an INI credit to Ensidesa. 
Up to 9.4 billions  ptas.to cover contingencies. 
Loss  compensation  of up  to  61.654  billions  ptas.to cover  additional  operating  losses  and 
financial  charges  in  1992 and  1993 and reduced  turnover arising  from  bringing  forward the 
Ansio closure. 
Social  aids  totalling  up  to  maximum  of 47.35  billions  ptas.  had  previously  been  authorized  as 
compatible with article 4.1  of the Steel Aid Code. 
11.  Outstanding questions from the previous monitoring report 
Main outstanding issues after the second monitoring report have been investigated by the Commission 
with the help of information provided by the Spanish authorities in answering requests and in meetings 
with the Commission  and companies representatives. 
Conclusions on  the major points are reported  here as  follows,  other points arising  from the second 
monitoring report will  be addressed in  the relevant sections of this report. 
1.  Capitalization of past approved credits 
As  recalled  in  the  last  report  in  February  1994  both  Ensidesa  and  AHV  proceeded  with 
capitalisation operation, approved by the Council, for which provision had been made in their 
1993 balance sheets. 
Since the approved credits were expressed in pesetas at 1.1.92 value, while the capitalisations 
were made only in  1994,  the company revaluated  the amounts in  order to take into account 
the inflation for the lapse oftime from 1992 and 1994 so to translate the nominal pesetas into 
current ones. 
The position  of the  Commission  remains  that approved aids  have to  be  considered  at their 
nominal  value  and  that the  realized  capitalisations  can  be  accepted  to  the extent that the 
amounts paid will  remain within the envelope of aids authorised by the Commission decision 
and approved by the Council. 
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The Spanish Government,  although maintaining  its position on the principle,  has advised the 
Commission  that  the  aid  paid  will  remain  under the  envelope  of the aids  approved  by  the 
Council  under the art.  95 ECSC decision. 
· 2.  Private nature of A.C.B. 
Decision  94/258  ECSC  under art.  95  specifically  required  that the genuine private nature of 
the  new  Sestao  project  (now  Aceria  Compacta  de  Bizkaia  - A.C.B.)  be  undisputably 
demonstrated. In order to comply with the decision's requirements, the Commission has asked 
further information to  the Spanish authorities and sent members of the  steel  monitoring  task 
force to performe visits to all shareholders of A.C.B  ..  These visits took place between March 
6 and  March 17,  1995. 
From  the  collected  information  the  Commission  services  were  able  to  draw  the  followin·g 
conclusions : 
All  shareholders are confident of a good return on their investment.  Each of them,  regardless 
of ~heir nature (eg  bank,  supplier of equipment or potential customer) has demonstrated that 
it have genuine economic motivations to participate in  it,  such as : 
1.  the possibilty of covering a part of the credit and banking activities of A. C. B  ..  for the 
banks, 
2.  the  acquisition  of a good  portfolio  image  by  participating  in  a new  ,technologically 
advanced project,  for the suppliers of equipment. 
3.  the  possibility  of having easier commercial  relations,  for the  possible customers. 
Furthermore. a major factor behind their participation  is the presence of Mr lmaz as president 
of A. C. B.  All the shareholder expressed complete confidence in  him and great respect for his 
management capabilities. 
The  structure of the ownership of A. C. B.  and  the  represantation on the board of directors is 
as follows: 
-CSI  page 2-
.. 
.  -STEEL MONITORING REPORT No 3,  May  1995, CSI 
SHAREHOLDER  %  SUBCRIBED  NATURE OF THE 
CAPITAL  SHAREHOLDER 
(mill.  ptas.) 
C.S.I.  30  2400  Public  (3  members on the 
board) 
Socade  10  800  Public  (1  member on the board) 
B.C. H.  7  560  Private (1  member on the board) 
B.E.X.  7  560  *  (1  member on the 
board) 
B.B.K.  7  560  Private (1  member on the board) 
B.B.V.  7  560  Private (1  member on the board) 
Bo.  Urquijo  5  400  Private 
G.  Esp. Estampac.  5  400  Private 
Tubo Consult.  5  400  Private 
F"  lribecampo  5  400  Private 
Cosimet S.L.  2,5  200  Private 
C.A.N.  2,86  228.8  Private 
Cosim S.A.  1  80  Private 
Ferroauantica  1  80  Private 
Prom.AC.Comp  1  '14  91.2  Private 
Cial.  Laminados  0,5  40  Private 
D.Javier lmaz  0,5  40  Private (president of the board) 
lngelectric S.A.  80  Private 
Bac.  Atl~mtico  1,5  120  Private 
nature stur  under exam1nat1on 
The  private  majority  of the ownership of A.C.B.  can  be  confirmed  as at least 53  % of the 
subscribed capital and  shares are in  hand of private entities. 
Concerning the composition of the board of directors of A. C. B., it is comprised of 9 members: 
4  between  CSI  and  the  Basque  Regional  Government,  5  from  the  private  shareholders 
including one tor the bank BEX. These members are appointed by the general assembly of the 
company and  globally  represent all  shareholders. 
The key point is whether BEX has to  be considered a private or a public entity. 
BEX  is  owned  by  more than  70  %  by  Argentaria  which  in  turn  is owned  by  51  % by  the 
Spanish state. By Spanish law,  BEX is considered private,  it is member of the private banking 
association and it is not submitted to the reporting obligations that public companies have to 
undergo.  Its management states that its  behavior on  the market is guided purely by  private 
rules.  No reports indicate the contrary and  apparently very  often  their terms are considered 
more tougher than other banks. 
It also has to be borne in mind that Argentaria is the process of being privatized (this process 
started  in  1993 and  should  be completed  in  1995) .The  private or public nature of BEX and 
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its behaviour will  continue to be examined. 
ltl.  The new monitoring report 
The  th1rd  monitoring report was received  from the Spanish  authorities on the 15th of March 1995, in 
compliance with  the requirements of the decision under art.  95. 
1.  Capacity reductions 
The capacity reduction programme started in March 1994 is continuing on schedule.  During the 
second half of 1994 the dismantling of the coke batteries at Sestao was completed. 
In September 1994 the Commission services received from C.S.I. the notification of the foreseen 
closure  of the Ansio hot rolling  mill scheduled, as required  by the decision,  for the end of 1995. 
2.  Investments 
During the  second  half of 1994,  the investments related  to the  upgrading  and enlarging  of the 
coking batteries and  blast furnaces at Gij6n  have been approved by C.S.I. management. These 
investments are  in  line with  the approved restructuring  plan  and their cost is estimated at 47.2 
billions  ptas.  ( vs.  48.0  billions  ptas.  in  the plan).Their financing  will  be  exclusively  done with 
C.S.I.  own resources. 
Due  to  the  delay  in  the approval of the  plan,  the  investment plan  has  not been  implemented 
according to the initial  schedule.  In the second monitoring report the question was raise.j if this 
delay could jeopardize the viability  of the restructuring pli:m  itself. According to the management 
of C.S.I. since the implementation of the plan was delayed, also the starting of the investments, 
which are part of the plan,  had to be delayed in order to allow the  three new operating units (see 
below " Creation of a new "V" company), to carry them out. The Spanish  authorities  underline 
that this delay does not put into danger the viability  of the restructuring  plan  itself.  This  point, 
however, will  be object of continued examination  by  the Commission services. 
3.  Reduction of Workforce 
The reduction  of the workforce is  proceeding  ahead of schedule.  During  1994,  1136 additional 
workers left the company bringing  the total workforce reductions since 1991  to 6879 people vs. 
5509 foreseen in  the plan  ( i.e.  1370 reductions more). 
Total  costs for 1994 reductions were 38199 millions  ptas. of which 12750 millions  ptas.  related 
to  payments to workers affected by  previous restructuring. 
Total  amount of social  costs paid  by  the company during the elapsed restructuring  period  was 
57.9 billions ptas.  out of which  35.7 billions ptas.  is expected to be covered by  the State under 
art.  56 ECSC either for people affected by previous restructuring or the current one. The balance 
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22.2 billions ptas.at charge of the company will  be covered by state aids approved under art. 4.1 
SAC and art.  95  ECSC  in  equal parts. 
In  the  second  monitoring  report  the  question  was  raised  on  the  impact  on  the  financial 
performance of the company due to the delay in  payments of the aids.  About this question, the 
Spanish  authorities  answered that  it was true  that,  for this  reason,  the  company  had  to  bear 
additional financial costs, but that the latter was confident that the better than expected operating 
results  would  cover  these  additional  costs  so  that  the  viability  of  the  plan  would  not  be 
compromised. 
The Commission services will continue to scrutinize this point seeking more information and more 
will  be  reported in  the next report. 
4.  Production 
Production for the year 1994 and comparison with previous years can be summarized as follows: 
(in  thousands tonnes) 
Actual  1992  1993  1994  199311992  %  199411993 
Production  change  change 
Liquid  Steel  4657  5329  5361  14.43  0.60 
H.  R  Coils  3479  3739  3762  7.47  0.62 
Heavy Plates  506  522  589  3.16  12.84 
Wire  Rods  363  385  415  6.06  7.79 
H.  Sections  290  289  223  (0.34)  (22.84) 
1994 production figures are generally ahead of plan except in the long products as shown 
below: 
(in  thousand tonnes) 
Planned  Production  1994  Actual  vs.  Planned 
(%changes) 
Liquid  Steel  5150  4.10 
Hot Rolled  Coils  3450  9.04 
Heavy Plates  550  7.09 
Long  Products  700.  (8.86) 
5.  Sales 
% 
Sales of finished products during 1994, totalled 5.42 millions tons,  6.6% above 1993 sales and 
12.4% above plan. 
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Breakdown of sales by  market shows an  increase in  the share of domestic sales compared  to 
1993 spec1ally  in  the second part of 1994, asshown in  the following  table: 
(1n  % share of sales) 
Markets  1992  1993  1994  1st.  H.  1994  2nd.  H.  1994 
Domestic  69  15  63.56  65.80  62.39  69.08 
Other EC  16.03  15.73  17.40  18.27  16.57 
0. Countries  14.82  20.72  16.80  19.34  14.35 
This  trend  can be  explained  by  two  reasons  : a)  in  the  present tight market situation,  foreign 
producers  have less  material  available  for  export,  b)  due to  the devaluation  of the  pesetas, 
imports are more expensive for the Spanish consumer. 
The Spanish authorities have also provided average prices charged by C.S.I during 1994. When 
compared to 1993 average prices,  double digits increases can be seen  in  almost all products. 
The Commission services have examined this information and concluded that the prices charged 
are within  the normal range. 
6.  Financial  Performance 
As  it  has  been  stated  in  the previous  monitoring  report,  until  the  new company sucessor of 
Ensidesa and AHV has not been created,  it is impossible to compare directly the actual figures 
with those forecasted under the plan.  Since the rJeW  company (see below "creation of the new 
"V" company) will  only  be operational in  1995, for the period covered by  this monitoring report 
the situation  is alike the one described in  the last report.  Therefore we will  limit ourselves to a 
comparison of the aggregated Ensidesa and AHV results for 1994 as provided by the Spanish 
authorities. 
Main economic and financial  results are reported as follows : 
(in  millions  of ptas.) 
Ensidesa & AHV  1993  1994 
Turnover  266274  312109 
Cost of Sales  277351  282009 
Depreciation  21983  21319 
Net Operating  Result  (34587)  6746 
Financial  Charges  45073  31405 
Net Results  (98274)  (51692) 
LIT & SIT Debts  517089  414658 
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94/93  I H.  94/ 
I H.  93 
17.21  20.38 
1.68  (1.36) 
(3.02)  (2.85) 
119.5  89.20 
(30.32)  (28.49) 
47.4  48.39 
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As it can  be seen  from these figures,  total  results for the year 1994 have confirmed the trend 
already present in the first half and definite improvements have been done in both operating and  . 
net results.  The financial charges have also decreased substancially  but they are still  about 10 
% of the turnover ( down from  17 % in  1993). 
Total debts were down almost 20 %,  but remain  at a very high  level. 
Having received complete figures for the year 1994, the Commission services are able to update 
the exercise already  done in  the previous report,  that is to compare the actual results with the 
performance forecasted in the restructuring plan.  In order to do that, since the income from the 
sale of these two companies to the new company "V" have not been received as planned by the 
"dormant" AHV and  Ensidesa companies,  and  since the forecast aid  has not been paid yet to 
the  same companies  in  order to  balance  their accounts,  these amounts have to  be deducted 
from the plan  in  order to  make the figures comparable. 
The  following  table  summarize  these  operations  for  the  year  1994  as  well  as  the  similar 
operation made for the years 1992 and  1993 and reported in  annex 1 of the previous report. 
(in millions ptas.) 
Planned  "dormant"  AHV  ''dormant"  new company "V''  TOTAL 
ENSIDESA 
1992-1993 net  (2085)  (49927)  (10408)  (62420) 
results 
1994 Net Results  0  0  (2718)  (2718) 
Actual  AHV  ENSIDESA  new company "V''  TOTAL 
1992-1993 net  (60967)  (137226)  0  (198213) 
results 
1994 Net Results  (16638)  (35054)  0  (51692) 
Actual vs. 
Forecast 
1992-1993  (137793) 
1994  (48974)  . 
1992 to 1994 actual results fell short of the planned ones by 186,767 millions ptas. However this 
difference can  be  easily  explained  when  we  take  into  account that in  the plan  the "dormant" 
companies were already  receiving  since  1993 payments for the shares transferred to  the new 
company as well  as  payments of aids.  Also a compensation for additional losses in  1992-1993 
was also foreseen by the decision. Taking into account these elements, a complete reconciliation 
of the actual and  plan  figures can  be done, as follows  : 
-CSI  page 7-STEEL MONITORING  REPORT No  3,  May  1995, CSI 
(in millions ptas.) 
Amounts to be added to actual  AHV  ENSIDESA  TOTAL 
results In order to compare them with 
the plan 
1992-1993 
Incomes from sale of shares  7783  23352  31135 
expected to be received 
Expected payment of aids  38704  14046  52750 
Additional loss compensation  53153 
total  137038 
1994 
Incomes from sale of shares  6746  20238  26984 
expected to be  received 
Expected payment of aids  8872  14839  23711 
total  50695 
Final Reconciliation  1992-1993  1994  TOTAL 
Actual vs. Plan  (135793)  (48974)  (184767) 
Amounts to be added  137038  50695  187733 
Total  1245  1721  2966 
Having done this exercise, it can be concluded that, assuming these payments of foreseen aids, 
C.S.I. actual results are in  line with the financial  performance forecasted under the restructuring 
plan. 
7.  Creation of the new "V" company 
The  new company "V" which  under the plan  was supposed to be  created  at the beginning of 
1993, was formally created  in  October 1994.  The transfer of the assets from the old  Ensidesa 
and  AHV companies will  be performed during the first quarter 1995. 
The new group consists of four companies : 
CSI  Corporaci6n Siderurqica,  S.A. 
This company will act as the holding of the group 
CSI  Productos Pianos,  S.A. 
This company will operate the Gij6n blast furnaces, the Aviles steel plant and the hot 
and cold rolling  mill  at Aviles and  EcMvarri. 
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CSI  Productos Largos,  S.A. 
This  company  will  concentrate  on  the  production  of long  steel  products  and  will 
operate the steel plant at Gij6n as well as the rolling  mills for wire rods,  profiles and 
quarto plates. 
CSI Trasformados.  S.A. 
This  company will  include  the old  subsidiaries  of AHV and  ENSIDESA in  Navarra 
(Laminaciones  de  Lesaca,  S.A.)  and  in  Asturias  (Perfrisa)  and  will  manage  the 
distribution of all  the transformed products. 
8.  Privatisation 
As  anticipated  in  the  second  monitoring  report,  the  new "Aceria  Compacta de Bizkaia"  was 
created and registered on 27.7.94. The structure and nature of the ownership of this company 
is  has described and  discussed under paragrah II.  2 of this report.  In  this section the analysis 
is limited to its financing, the ordering of the equipment and the schedule of its realisation.  It has 
to be underlined that, although facts about this company are in the monitoring reports under the 
C.S.L heading, this is a completely separated company in which C.S.I. only has a partecipation. 
a)  Financing 
To carry out its investments the A.C.B. will need 50 billions ptas. (amount estimated 
in  the plan  was 62.5 billions  ptas.). The start up capital paid by the shareholder was 
8 billions  ptas.,  but an  increase in  capital is already foreseen to bring the company 
own  resources  to  the level  of 35  % of the  investment needs.  All  shareholders will 
participate to this capital increase on  a pro-rata basis. 
The rest of the financing for the company will  be found  in  the market with the help of 
a financial adviser who will create a consortium of lending banks. These loans will be 
at market conditions without state guarantees. The final  level of these loans should 
be around 30 billions ptas., expected to be available during the third quarter of 1995. 
b)  Ordering of the Equipment 
Over  90  %  of  the  required  equipment  has  been  already  ordered  and  the  first 
installation works have started. 
The realisation of the plant will be done as a "turn key" contract made with a grouping 
of private  companies.  According  to  the  contract  each  part  of the  project  can  be 
subcontracted. This contract cover the realisation  of the following  equipment : 
- Electrical furnaces 
- Compact Unit 
- Civil works 
- Subsidiary equipment 
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Another contract cover the realisation of the electrical substation and the high-tension 
power line. 
c)  Foreseen  schedule 
Construction works started  between  29.12.94 and  15.2.95.  At the  present time the 
most  advanced  ones  are  the  construction  of  the  electrical  substation  and  the 
foundations for the steel  plant. 
The foreseen construction programme is  as follows  : 
- End  of the assembly of the electric furnaces 
- End of the assembly of the compact unit 
- Start up of the plant and  of production operations 
before March 1996 
before  september 
1996 
17.9.96 
- Provisional delivery of the plant by  the contractors 
1  March/September 1997 
- Final  delivery of the plant by the contractors  one year later 
A possible contract for the sale of all or part of the A. C. B.  production to CSI is still under negotiation. 
If concluded,  the negotiated price will  have to be in  line with market prices. 
9.  Aid  Payments 
Up to 31.12.94 th<! only aid used by C.S.I. are the capitalised amounts mentioned in the second 
monitoring  report,  as follows  : 
For AHV:  a total of 41.024 billions  ptas  which  remained from  91.1  billions  ptas.  of 
credits authorized  to be  converted into capital  under Protocol  10 of Spain Treaty of 
Accession.  This  completes the aids paid  under this Protocol. 
For Ensidesa: 56.4 billions out of the global437.8 billions of aids authorized under the 
art.  95 decision. 
Beside  these  56.4  billions  ptas.  for  capitalisation  operations  no  other  aid  was  paid  by  the 
Spanish Government during the period  . 
10.  Terms and  Conditions  of new loans 
During the course of the second half 1994, C.S.I. has obtained loans totalling 59.5 billions ptas., 
supported by state guarantee. Of this amount, 50 billions were obtained in two tranches (37,050 
and 12,950 millions respectively) by two groupings of Spanish and foreign banks both led by the 
' The contract guarantee foresee two periods. After the first six months of  operation and within an year, there is a preliminary 
delivery of the plant.  The final delivery will  take place one year after the  preliminary  one. 
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Spanish  private  bank  BBV.  As  in  previous cases,  the premium  for the guarantee was 0.125% 
per annum. 
From  the  examination  of the terms  and  conditions  of these facilities  and  the  associated  state 
guarantees,  it  appears that no  state aid  elements were  involved  since these facilities  were at 
market rates. 
Finally,  the  Commission  services  have  questioned  how  funds  had  been  provided  for  CSI's 
partecipation  in  A.C.B.'s  capital.  Company  officials  have  stated  the  funds  came  from  the 
company cash flow,  but from the data provided so far,  it  is not possible to confirm this.  Further 
details have been  requested to the Spanish  authorities to clarify this point. 
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Monitoring of Article 95 ECSC steel cases 
Third Report, May 1995 
SIDENOR, Spain 
On  12 April 1994 (Commission Decision 94/261/ECSC)  the Commission authorised aids under Article 
95  ECSC totalling  80.052 billion  pesetas,  made up as follows: 
- up  to 26.3 billion  pesetas for debt write-offs; 
- up to 7.79 billion  pesetas social aids; 
- up to 20.2 billion  pesetas in  the form of new paid-in capital;  and 
- up to 25.762  billion  pesetas in the form of loss compensation to cover additional operating  losses 
and financial  charges in  1992 and  1993. 
Previously  the  Commission  had  also  approved  social  aids  totalling  up  to a maximm  of 7.79  billion 
pesetas as being compatible with Article 4.1  of the Steel Aids Code. 
II.  Outstanding questions from the previous monitoring report 
1.  Implementation of the restructuring plan 
The restructuring plan for Sidener foresaw the acquisition of the activities of both Acenor and 
Foarsa by  Sidener itself.  As also mentioned in  previous reports,  this acquisition  was delayed 
and will take place only in the beginning of 1995,  therefore the comparison of  the combined 
results of Acenor and Foarsa with  the plan  is not very meaningful. 
The  Spanish  authorities  have now  informed  the  Commission  that  on  30.12.94  Acenor and 
Foarsa  transferred their steel  activities  to  Sidener and  will  remain  as "dormant" companies 
only  carrying out operations linked  to  their liquidation. 
The  new Sidener company is operative from  1.1.95 having assumed all  the assets of Acenor 
and Foarsa and their respective liabilities. 
The configuration of the new group is  as follows : 
three  operating  units  : Basauri,  Viloria,  Reinosa  (Hernani  and  Llodio  having  been 
closed and Larrondo sold). 
one operative subsidiary (Fovisa)  for forging and stamping. 
one distribution  subsidiary  (C.A.  Heva). 
various service and distribution companies. 
The workforce will  be 2100 people,  or 32  less than planned. 
Once  the  accounts  have  been  finalized  and  transmitted  to  the  Commission  services,  an 
analysis can  be  made in  order to verify their compliance with  the restructuring  plan  and  the 
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art 95  ECSC decision. 
This  exercise will  be a matter to be covered in  the  next monitoring  report. 
Finally,  the  Spanish  authorities  have  informed  the  Commission  that  the  shareholders  of 
Sidener (INI  and ICO) have contracted a consulting  company to advise them as regards the 
possible  privatisation of the company. 
According to press reports many companies inside and outside of Europe have demonstrated 
their interest in  acquiring Sidenor. 
2.  Impact of the sale of Larrondo on the plan 
Under the art 95  ECSC decision, the Larrondo plant was to be closed or sold off.As reported 
in the second monitoring report, the plant was finally sold. The Commission asked the Spanish 
authorities to provide information on the impact on the plan of this development with particular 
reference to the social  costs to  be borne by  Sidenor. 
The  Spanish  authorities  in  their answer  demonstrated that  in  fact  the  sale  rather than  the 
closure of Larrondo had a positive net impact on the company accounts of about 1140 millions 
ptas. As regards the impact on the social aids approved under art.  95 ECSC, these should be 
487 millions  ptas.  less than in  the case of closure. 
Other points pending after the second monitoring report will be addressed in the relevant parts of this 
report. 
Ill.  The  new monitoring report 
This third  monitoring report on Sidenor is based on  information contained in the fifth quarterly report 
by  the  Spanish authorities,  submitted on  15th March 1995 in  accordance with  Commission  decision 
94/261/ECSC. The following  analysis also draws on  the data provided by  the  Spanish authorities  in 
their fourth quarterly report of 15.12.94, as  required by the decision. 
1.  Capacity reductions 
With  the sale of the Larrondo plant,  all  the foreseen reduction of capacity at Sidenor can be 
considered concluded in accordance with decision 94/261/ECSC. 
2.  Investments 
About 93  % of the  investments foreseen under the plan  had  been  performed  by  the end of 
year 1994  Details are as  follows  : 
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(m  m1lhons  ptas ) 
Area of Investments  Amount of investment 
Rationalisation  of the Basauri steel plant  680 millions  ptas. 
Remodelling  of the Basauri rolling  mill  876 millions ptas. 
Rationalisation  of the Reinosa steel plant  944 millions  ptas. 
Modifications to the forging and foundry at  1499 millions ptas. 
Reinosa 
Investments for environmental protection  900 Millions  ptas. 
The types of investments and amounts are in line with the approved plan. Their financing was 
covered by loans (for conditions see below "Terms and conditions of new loans"). 
Completion of the planned investments is foreseen for June 1995. 
3.  Workforce  reductions 
The  active  workforce of Sidener at the  end of 1994  was  2332  people  and  the  number of 
people  laid  off during  the  year was  546,  bringing  to  2393  the  number laid  off  since  the 
beginning of the restructuring.  Since the total workforce reductions required by the plan were 
2593 (including  413 for Larrondo- not included  in  the calculation  in  the second  monitoring 
report), 200 more people will  have to be  laid off during  1995 to comply with the plan. 
4.  Production 
Production  for the year  1994 and  comparison  with  previous  years  can  be  summarized  as 
follows: 
(in  thousands tonnes) 
Actual  1992  1993  1994  1993/1992%  1994/1993% 
Production  change  change 
liquid Steel  544.0  524.4  640.4  (3.6)  22.1 
Special Steels  461.0  416.4  534.2  (9.7)  28.3 
Stainless Steel  19.4  21.6  15.2  11.4  (29.8) 
F  o  rge&Foundry  26.6  31.5  39.5  18.4  25.2 
Since  the  Sidener  plan  does  not  provide  details  on  planned  production  year  by  year,  a 
comparison of actual vs.  planned figures is impossible. 
5.  Sales 
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Total  sales  of Side nor during  1994 were 491.8 thousand  tons,  22.3 % higher than  1993, but 
10.6 % below plan. 
Their breakdown  by  market shows  an  increase in  the  share of sales  in  the domestic market 
and a decrease in the other markets,  a trend to be considered  normal due to the tight market 
conditions  and  the  devaluation  of  the  peseta,  making  imports  more  expensive  for  the 
consumer. 
Details of the sales breakdown are as follows  : 
(in  per cent share of total sales) 
Markets  1993  1994  1st.  H.  1994 
Domestic  53.9  52.0  57.3 
Other EC  40.7  38.7  35.3 
0. Countries  5.5  9.3  7.3 
The Spanish  authorities have also provided average prices charged  by  Sidener during  1994. 
The Commission services have examined these data and concluded that prices charged are 
within the normal range. 
6.  Financial  Performance 
The  Spanish  authorities have provided data,separately,  for the two companies : Acenor and 
Foarsa. Their results,  when combined,  give the following  figures (plan figures are reported as 
a reference) : 
(in  millions  of ptas.) 
1994  1993  1994 plan 
Turnover  43913  31514  43953 
Losses  23444  22379  1871 
Net Op.  Result.  (6438)  (11667)  1430 
Finan.  Charges  9969  8523  2951 
Finan  Debts  69953  48301  21719 
Even if the combined  turnover is  in  line  with  the  plan  and  the  operating  results  show clear 
improvements,  the financial  situation of the two companies has deteriorated. 
For the  reasons  we  have stated  above  in  section  11.1  and  in  the  previous  monitoring  report, 
it  is  difficult  to  compare  the  actual  with  the  planned  results.  Nethertheless,  it should  not be 
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forgotten that in the plan a capital injection of 20.2 billions ptas. was foreseen before 1995 (out 
of which  only  8.2  billions  ptas.  was  injected  in  late  1993).  This  plus  the  aid  foreseen  for 
compensation  of the  1992-1993 losses,  which  has not been  paid  yet,  for 25.8 billions  ptas. 
could  explain  to a large extent the  differences  between the actual  and  planned  results  and 
level of indebtedness. 
Only  when  the data about the  new Sidener company are available (which will  be  during  the 
first quarter 1995 and will be reported in the next quarterly monitoring report), the Commission 
services will  be in  the position to make a proper comparison of the financial  performance of 
Sidener and the requirements of the art.  95 ECSC decision. 
7.  Terms and  conditions  of new loans 
In the previous monitoring report the need for further investigations on a loan carrying a state 
guarantee was  noted.  According  to  the  information  provided  by  the  Spanish  authorities  an 
additional premium of 0.125% was paid on the guarantee for this loan  so that the terms and 
conditions  were in  line  with  what  was  previously  paid  and  with  the  rate  prevailing  on  the 
market. 
During the second half of 1994 new loans for 19.7 billions  ptas.  have been obtained of which 
10.9 billions  ptas.were with  state guarantees.  The  conditions appear to be at normal market 
rates.  but the Commission  services will  continue to investigate whether or not these facilities 
contain any  element of aid. 
8.  Aid payment 
No aids were paid in  the  period covered  by this report. 
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Monitoring of Article 95 ECSC steel cases 
Third Report 
ILVA,  Italy 
On  12 April 1994 ( Commission Decision 94/259/ECSC) the Commission authorised aids under Article 
95  ECSC totalling  4790 billions  lit.  in the following  forms: 
write-off of residual  debt up to a maximum of 2943  billions  lit.  after sale of assets 
coverage  by  IRI  of restructuring  and  liquidation  expenditures of up  to a maximum  of 1197 
billions lit. 
capital  injection  by  IRI of 650 billions  lit. 
II.  Outstanding questions from the previous monitoring report 
The  main  outstanding  issues  after  the  second  monitoring  report  have  been  investigated  by  the 
Commission with the help of information provided  by the Italian authorities in  answering requests and 
in  meetings between the Commission  and company representatives. 
Conclusions or development on the major points are reported here as follows,  other points arising from 
the second monitoring report will  be addressed in the relevant sections of this report. 
1.  Capacity reductions 
The Commission services on 8.2.95 visited the installations at Bagnoli and Taranto that were 
subject of capar:lty  reductions in  accordance with  the art.  95 ECSC decision. 
The  conclusions  of these inspections were that at Taranto,  the two reheating furnaces have 
been dismantled and their essential  parts removed while the rolling  mill  at Bagnoli has been 
made  non-operational,  but it  has  not yet  been dismantled  since there are  negotiations with 
parties outside tr1e  EEC  for its sale. 
Therefore, the Commission considers that the requirements set in the art. 95 ECSC decision 
have been  satisfied.  It will,  however, continue to follow the developments at Bagnoli 
2.  Workforce reductions 
As anticipated  in the second monitoring report,  the Italian authorities  issued  on 7.12.94 new 
legislation  to  regulate  the  preretirement of workers  in  the public  and  private  steel  industry. 
Waiting  for  this  new  legislation  the  companies  have  delayed  the  bulk  of the  dismissals 
foreseen  by  the  plan.  Natural  dismissals  occurring  during  1994  in  each  company  will  be 
reported  in  the relevant sections of this report. 
In  early  1995,  the  Commission  received  additional  information  on  the  schedule  of  the 
workforce reductions for the old  I  Iva group  that will  take place during the course of this year. 
The Commission services will analyse these data and their conclusions will be a matter for the 
next monitoring report. The reductions due to closures notified to the Commission in January 
1994 will  also be  subject to  the  new legisation  and will  be part of the same analysis by  the 
Commission services.  Social aid for workforce reductions due to closures and not covered by 
aids under art.  56  ECSC,  is  to be covered by aids under art. 4(1) of the Steel  Aid  Cod~ and 
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II.  The  new monitoring  report 
This third monitoring report on ILVA is based on the information submitted by the Italian authorities on 
15th March  1995 in  accordance with  Commission decision 94/259/ECSC. 
Since  as  of the  1.1. 94  the  group  llva was  split  in  three  distinct  companies  ( ILP,  AST  and  llva  in 
Liquidazione ) and the privatisation of some of them is completed or under way,  the Commission has 
decided  to treat their analysis separately. 
ILP 
1.  Capacity reductions 
Besides the capacity reductions performed at Taranto already reported in the previous report 
and in the chapter above, the future buyer of ILP, according to the art. 95 ECSC decision, will 
have to close an additional 500,000 tons of hot rolling  capacity at mill  n· 2 in Taranto or at an 
other Italian  plant situated elsewhere within  six  months from  the  date of the  privatisation  of 
ILP.  This  point will  be also covered under the sector "Privatisation" of this report. 
2.  Investments 
The  investments  started  during  the  first  half  of  1994  have  been  concluded  according  to 
schedule.  They  mainly  concerned  the  refurbishing  of a blast  furnace  at  Taranto  and  other 
maintenance works at Taranto,  Novi and other controlled companies. 
Total  costs were 397 billions  lit.  vs.  a budgeted amount of 571  billions  lit.,  all  covered by the 
company's own resources. 
3.  Workforce reductions 
During the course of 1994, reported data show a net workforce reduction of 744 people.  Total 
active workforce of ILP at the end of 1994 was 17457 people,  940 more than plan due to the 
above-mentioned delays in  the new legislation. 
4.  Production 
Production  for the  year  1994  and  comparison  with  previous  years  can  be  summarized  as 
follows: 
(in  thousands tonnes) 
Actual  1992  1993  1994  1993/1992%  1994/1993% 
Production  change  change 
Pig  Iron  7808  8203  8208  5.1  0.1 
Liquid Steel  7843  8252  8457  5.2  2.5 
H.  R.  Coils  6361  5916  6500  (7.0)  9.9 
Plates  1074  1020  1155  (5.0)  13.2 
1994 production figures  are in  all cases ahead of plan as follows : 
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(in  thousands tonnes) 
Planned  Production  1994  Actual vs. Planned 
(%changes) 
Pig Iron  7880  4.2 
Liquid  Steel  7865  7.5 
Hot Rolled  Coils  6400  1.6 
Plates  1005  14.9 
5.  Sales 
Sales of finished products during 1994 totalled 7.47 millions tons, 9.5% above 1993 sales and 
9.9% above plan. 
Breakdown of sales  by  market shows  an  increase in  the  share of domestic sales and other 
EC  markets compared with  1993 figures a specially  in  the  second half of 1994,  as shown in 
the following  table : 
(in  %share of sales} 
Markets  1992  1993  1994  1st.  H.  1994  2nd.  H.  1994 
Domestic  71.8  67.9  68.9  66.7  69.4 
Other EC  13 9  12.7  15.1  12.5  14.9 
0. Countries  14.3  19.4  16.0  20.8  15.7 
This  trend can be considered as normal due to  the tight market situation and the devaluation 
of the lira  which  makes imports more expensive for the Italian consumer. 
The Italian authorities have also provided averages prices charged by  ILP during 1994. The 
Commission services have examined these data and concluded that prices charged are within 
the  normal range. 
6.  Financial Performance 
The  financial  performance of ILP  during  1994 has  been  better than  expected  in  the  plan as 
it can  be  seen from the following  table  : 
(in  billions  of lit.) 
1994  1994  PLANNED  % change over plan 
Turnover  9052.6  6807  33.0 
Gr.  operative margin  1155.2  776  48.9 
Depreciation  374.6  245  52.9 
Operating  results  904.1  531  70.3 
Net fin.  charges  146.0  173  (15.6) 
Net results  700.0  160  337.5 
Net Financial Debts  1408.8  1608  (12.4) 
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Since  ILP did  not existed  as  a separate entity  in  1993,  comparisons with  that year are  not 
possible except for few items : turnover in  1994 was 14.6 % more than the estimated one for 
1993  and  the  financial  charges  have  been  cut  in  half  versus  the  1993  ones.  The  ratio 
finanacial charges/turnover that at the outset of the company at the beginning of 1994 was 
3.47 %,  it was 2.5% after the first six months and  1.61  %at the end of the year. 
Other financial indexes are also better than planned : Operating results are 10 % of turnover 
vs.  the  8 %  planned,  the  return  on  the  investment is at about 25  % vs.  the planned  one of 
about 16% and the debt/equity ratio is  0.63 ( 0.94  in  the plan). 
7.  Terms and  condition  of new loans 
During  1994 ILP has not contracted  any loans since they were able to their needs with their 
own  resources. 
8.  Privatisations 
AST 
According to the art.  95  ECSC decision,  ILP had to be privatized  by the end  of 1994. Since 
at the end of the open bid  procedure which lasted for about six months from the end of 1993, 
no bids qualified according to the rules of the bidding process, lRI, the only ILP shareholder, 
proceeded with  bilateral  negotiations.  In September 1994, the Commission  asked the Italian 
authorities for more information on the status of the privatisation of ILP. The Italian authorities 
answered that on  10.12.!;l4 the negotiations resulted  in  IRI  receiving  two firm offers,  but that 
due to the political changes underway a choice could only be possible by the 1Oth of January 
1995. 
On that date the Italian authorities announced that the group Riva  it had been chosen as the 
only partner in the negotiations for the ILP privatisation and that a time limit of six weeks was 
set for their conclusion. 
At the end of this period,  on March 2,  1995, IRI communicated to the Commission that they 
had accepted the offer of the Riva Group. On 14.3.95, the Italian authorities officially approved 
the  sale  of 100 % of ILP  to the  group  Riva.  After the final  authorisation  of the  European 
Commission  of this  operation\ the transfer of the  shares will  take place and  details on  the 
operation itself will  be officially known. They will  be reported  in  the next monitoring report. 
When the acquisition  of ILP  is finalized,  the Group Riva will  proceed in  a capacity reduction 
of  500,000  tons  of hot  rolling  capacity,  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of the  art.  95 
ECSC decision,  within  six months from  the date of acquisition. 
It has to be pointed out that with the transfer of the shares from IRI to the new owner on 23.12.94 (see 
below "Pnvatisations"),  AST it is now a fully  private company. 
1.  Capacity reductions 
In  accordance  with  the  approved  restructuring  plan,  no  capacity  reductions  have  been 
performed during 1994. 
2.  Investments 
The investments foreseen during 1994 have been completed. They were mainly related to the 
liquid  steel and stainless steel production lines in Terni and Torino. Thes investments did not 
modify the production capacity of the company. 
Total  costs  of these  investments  were  48.8  billions  lit.  vs.  the  46.8  planned.  The  small 
1This final  approval was provided on  3.4.95 
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inscrease  versus  the  budgeted  amount  is  essentially  due  to  the  carry  forward  of  some 
investments scheduled  in  next year budget. 
3.  Workforce reductions 
At the end of 1994, AST  had  an  active workforce  of 4454  people  versus a planned  one of 
4108 ( 346 people  more). 
As  mentioned  before in  par.  11.1  and  also about ILP,  the  late issueing  of the new legislation 
on the preretirement is the cause of the delay of the reductions this should be made up during 
1995 and will  be matter of attention for the  next monitoring  report. 
4.  Production 
Production  for the  year  1994  and  comparison  with  previous  years can  be  summarized  as 
follows: 
(in  thousands \annes) 
Actual  1992  1993  1994  1993/1992%  1994/1993% 
Production  change  change 
Liquid  Steel  775.  811  954  4.6  17.6 
H.  Rolled  Coils  1042  860  970  (17.5)  12.8 
Cold  R.  Sheets  448  467  527  4.2  12.8 
Stainless  Steel  341  356  399  4.4  12.1 
S.S.  Hot Rolled  53  68  60  28.3  (11.8) 
S S.  Cold  Rolled  288  288  339  0.0  17.7 
1994 production figures are  in  most cases ahead  of plan  as follows  : 
(in  thousands \annes) 
Planned  Production  1994  Actual vs.  Planned 
changes) 
Liquid  Steel  917  4.0 
Hot Rolled Coils  846  14.7 
Cold  Rolled  Sheets  477  10.5 
Stainless Steel  375  6.4 
S.S.  Hat Rolled  65  (7.7) 
S.S.  Cold  Rolled  310  9.4 
5.  Sales 
Sales of finished products during 1994 totalled 822 thousands tons,  20.3% above 1993 sales. 
Cold  rolled  stainless  steel  sales were  347.6  thousands  tons,  23.4%  above  1993 and  8.6% 
above plan. 
Breakdown of sales by market shows an increase in the share of domestic sales,  stabilityin the 
one for other EC  markets and  a decrease in  the  share of sales to other countries compared 
with  1993 figures  , as shown  in  the following  table : 
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(in  'Yo  share of sales) 
Markets  1993  1994  1st.  H.  1994  2nd.  H.  1994 
Domestic  60.8  64.7  64.7  64.7 
Other EC  15.8  15.2  14.6  15.8 
0. Countries  23.4  20.2  20.7  19.5 
This trend can  be considered as normal due to the tight market situation  and the devaluation 
of the  lira  that makes imports more expensive for the Italian consumer. 
The Italian authorities have also provided averages prices charged  by AST during 1994. The 
Commission services have examined these data and concluded that prices charged are within 
the normal range. 
6.  Financial  Performance 
Since that at 15.3.95 final approved accounts were not yet available,  and since on the results 
of year 1994  has to  be  based  the  price  adjustment due from  the  buyer of AST  (see below 
"Privatisations"),  the  new  owners  of the  company  did  not  wanted  to  disclose  preliminary 
figures. 
As soon as they will  be made available to the Commission,  the Council will  be  informed. 
7.  Privatisations 
The  Commission  approved  the  sale  of  AST  to  the  KAI  consortium  (Krupp-
Thyssen, Riva, Falck, Ted fin)  on 23.12. 94 and on the same date the transfer of the share to the 
new owner was effected. 
The price for this sale has been agreed at 600 billions lit.  (200 billions  more than planned) on 
the  basis of the balance sheets at 31.12.93. An  additional compensation in  order to take into 
account the  results  of ttie company  from  31.12. 93  until  t~ e effective  sale  (practically  all  of 
1994) was also included  in  the sale contract. This compensation  is  going· to be based on the 
results  at  31.12.94.  This  additional  amount  will  be  known  as  soon  as  the  financial  and 
economic accounts for 1994 will  be finalized  and  approved;  this  should  happen  during April 
1995. 
The price will  be paid  in  four equal installments of which the first was paid on the transfer of 
the shares,  while  the others will  be  paid  after  12,  24  and  60  months respectively  after that 
date. Interest at an estabilished market rates will  be paid on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th installments. 
The additional compensation will be paid within 15 days from the approval of the 1994 balance 
sheets with interest at prime rate. 
AST has been sold with  all its assets and debts at the moment of the transfer of the shares. 
As  regards to  the extent to which the debts transferred to diminish  the  debt situation  of llva, 
the  debts transferred toAST at its  outset ( 31.12.93) have to be considered.  They were 536 
billions against the 474 billions  in  the plan. 
ILVA in  Liquidazione 
1.  Capacity reductions 
Beside what already stated about the Bag noli plant, llva in Liquidazione has not performed any 
other capacity reduction.  This is in  accordance with the approved restructuring  plan. 
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2.  Investments 
Also  in  accordance with  the  restructuring  plan,  no  investments  have been  made  during  the 
monitored period. 
3.  Workforce reductions 
For the reasons already stated in  par.  11.2  of this  report and  in  occasion of ILP and AST, the 
workforce  reduction  programme has  been  delayed.  The  Commission  will  maintain  a close 
check on  the developments of this  situation and  they will  be reported  in  the next monitoring 
report. 
Nethertheless,  during the second half of 1994 the workforce of llva  in  Liquidazione has been 
reduced  by  1460 people of which 980 due to the sale of some producing units to ILP. 
4.  Production & Sales 
Since  the companies  left  in  llva in  Liquidazione  are either operating  in  sectors others than 
steel,  or,  if in  steel, they produce non ECSC products, the Commission services do not think 
it  is  appropriate to report here data about their production or sales. 
5.  Financial Performance 
As  already  stated  in  the  second  monitoring  report,  the  structure  of  the  company  having 
signifincantly  changed since the spinning off of the other two companies (ILP and AST), it is 
not possible to make a meaningful! comparaison between the results of 1994 and the ones of 
the previous years. 
The  analysis therefore will  be only  on  few  relevant indicators and  for the greater part on  the 
level of indebtedness and its expected coverage by the incomes deriving from the privatisation 
process. 
Turnover for 1994 was 2755 billions  lit. 4% higher than forecasted at the end of the first half 
1994 and over 25  %the comparable figure for 1993. 
Losses  at  the  end  of  1994  were  1281  billions  lit.  mainly  due  to  provisions  for liquidation 
expenditure  up  to  the  end  of the  liquidation  process  foreseen  at  the  end  of  1997.  No 
comparable figures exist for 1993. 
Financial charges for the all of 1994 were 450 billions  lit.  18 billions better than expected six 
months ago and represented 16.3 %of the turnover. 
Indebtedness  for  the  consolidated  llva  in  Liquidazione  group  as  reported  by  the  Italian 
authorities for the year 1994, amounts to 7870 billions  lit. 
However, due to the changes in the structure of the group (spinning off of ILP and AST,  sales 
of other  subsidiaries  and  transfers  of debts),  this  level  of indebtedness  it  is  not  directly 
comparable to  the one existing  at the moment of the approval of the  plan. 
After, 
1.  having made all  necessary calculations to make them comparable; 
2.  keeping  in  mind that by  its decision taken on  23.12.93,  the Commission approved 
aid  of 4790  billions  lit.  for the  liquidation  and  restructuring  of llva,  consisting  of an 
injection  of 650 billions  lit.  - already granted by  IRI  in  1992 - and of 4140 billions  lit., 
which was the forecasted final balance of the debts to be taken over by IRI at the end 
of I  Iva's liquidation,  reduced by the income arising from the sale of ILP, AST and some 
other subsidiaries and  the debts transferred along with  their sale; 
3.  the Commission services being able,  after the second monitoring report, to deepen 
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their analysis on  the coverage of the llva in  Liquidazione indebtedness on  the basis 
of the official results at the end of 1994; 
1t  is possible to g1ve  a preliminary estimation of the coverage of llva indbtedness until the end 
of the liquidation  process based on  the preliminary results at the end of 1994 provided by the 
Italian authorities. It has to be stressed that the figures shown in the following table do not take 
into account, yet,  neither the final actual income from the sale of ILP to  the Riva Group, nor 
the  additional compensation for the sale of AST. 
(in  billions  lit ) 
PLAN  at 31.12.93  at the  end of liquid.  at the end of liquid. 
based on results  at  based on  prelim. 
30.6.94  results at 31.12.94 
Total  comparable  (1 0067)  (10889)  (11353)  (11756) 
llva  indebtednss 
Incomes from the  2806  2760  2960  2960 
sales of 
ILP,AST,Sofin. 
Debts transf.  to  1897  2546  2546  2546 
ILP,AST,Sofin. 
Other debts to be  1061  923  1013  1013 
transferred 
Other incomes from  1425  1425  1400  1400 
sales of companies 
Incomes from the  448  448  1253  1253 
liquidation  process 
Disboursements  (645)  (654)  (996)  (617) 
during the liquidation 
Liquidation costs  (1065)  (1065)  (895)  (640) 
Total  residual  (4140)  (4506)  (4072)  (3841) 
Indebtedness 
Var.  from  plan  366  (68)  (299) 
As it can be seen, based on the preliminary figures available,  the level of indebtedness at the 
end of 1994 was not exceeding the amount of approved aid.  When the actual results of the 
privatisation in process  will be incorporated in this table (ILP sale price- possibly 2500 billions 
lit. against the 1300 billions lit.  included in the table- and additional compensation for AST sale 
price),  the situation should further improve. 
The Commission services will continue to update these figures  as soon as final  1994 figures 
will  be available,  in order to make sure that the total final  indebtedness remain in  line with the 
approved aid. 
6.  Terms and  conditions  of llva in  Liquidazione's  financing 
In the second monitoring report it was said that the Commission was investigating on the terms 
and conditions of the financing of llva in Liquidazione.  The results of such investigation can be 
summarized as follows : 
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a)  At the end of 1993, time at which the liquidation  started, I  Iva in  Liquidazione  accounts 
showed a debts towards IRI for 1538 billions lit (included in the totalllva indebtedness 
to  be  covered  by  IRI  according  to  the  plan),  which  could  be  considered  as  a  first 
tranche of aid already grated under the art.  95 ECSC decision,  since IRI will never ask 
for its  repayment. 
b)  Also  during  1994, IRI has provided funds to llva in  Liquidazione  for  2159 billions  lit. 
which, togheter with the 1538 billions lit present at the beginnig of the liquidation,  bring 
the total of the aid  already paid  by  IRI  to 3697 billions  lit at the end of 1994, as it will 
be shown in  llva in  liquidazione's  books once finalized. 
c)  Under the  liquidation  procedure,  llva  has  financed  its  cash  flow  needs  with  funds 
coming from financial  institutions for 2153 billions  lit.  The  interest rate on  these stand 
by credit lines ;vith  banks have been  provided and seems to be  in  line with the ones 
charged in the market. According to their financial restructuring plan half of these loans 
will  be paid  back by June 1995 and the rest by the end  of 1996. 
d)  All  the above amounts are included  in the total  11756 billions  lit.  indebtedness that it 
will  be ultimately  covered by  IRI  less the amounts proceeding  from  the  privatisation 
process as well as from the  liquidation  of llva. 
As  already  stated,  the  present estimated  figure  for less  aid  of 299  billions  lit.,  will 
improve further when the final prices for the privatisation of ILP and AST will be known 
and  taken into account. 
7.  Privatisations 
Up  to  now,  llva  in  Liquidazione  has  sold  the ownership  or its  partecipation  in  the following 
companies (this list do not includes ILP and  AST which were owned and sold directly by  IRI): 
(in  billions  lit ) 
Companies  Buyer  Price  Debts transferred (applies 
only to  companies fully 
owned) 
Cogne Ace.  Speciali'  Marzorati Group  7  75 
ICMI  ILP  105  89.7 
TOI  ILP  30  50.3 
ISE  Edison-EDF,  ILP  420  4.4 
ICE  Valle  d'Aosta Region  86  (0.3) 
Sidermar di Navig.  Coe&Cierici  60.8 
Sidermar Serv.  Ace.  ILP  0.6 
Lavere Sidermecc.*  Lucchini Group  25 
Verres •  Finaosta  1.8 
TOTAL  736.2  219.1 
• Companies for which pnce payments have already been recetved  recetved dunng  1994 
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This compares with planned expected incomes for the same companies of 955 billions  lit.  and 
expected transfers of debts for 479 billions  lit.  Additional sales of partecipations not foreseen 
in the plan  should, according to the Italian authorities,  make up for the differences so that the 
total estimated income or debts transferred for these operations of 1425 billions  lit.  and 1061 
billions  lit respectively,  should be  met. 
The  only  major  companies  left  to  be  sold  are  Dalmine  and  Dalmine  Resine  for  whom 
negotiations are under way. 
Other small  companies  mentioned  in  the  last monitoring  report,  like  Saster (water systems 
designing) or llvanetwork (data transmission network) will be sold either to  a water distribution 
company for a nominal price,  or be split and  sold  among the interested companies of the old 
llva group. 
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I.  Introduction 
Monitoring of Article 95 ECSC steel aid cases 
Third Report, May 1995 
Siderurgia Nacional, Portugal 
The Commission decided on 12 April1994 to approve aids totalling 60.12 bn  Esc (309.6 MECU) 
under Article 95  ECSC Treatyl of which  38  bn Esc (191.5 MECU) are earmarked for a capital 
injection  and  22.12  bn  Esc  (113.9  MECU)  for  debt write-off.  The  Commission  approved  in 




The present report covers some outstanding questions from the second monitoring report that 
had  been  discussed  with the  Portugese  Government  in  the  meantime  and  the  information 
provided  by  the Portugese Government in  its third  monitoring  report,  which  was  submitted  on 
1  0 March  1995. 
11.  Outstanding questions from the second monitoring report 
In  the second monitoring report,  the Commission identified two issues of concern: the financial 
performance of the company and the question whether the Carti de Conforto were replaced by 
other aid. 
The question of financial performance,  related also to the question of redundancies,  has been 
discussed intensively with the Portugese authorities.  They provided a range of explanations and 
figures in  so far which are being  reported under Ill.  3 and  Ill.  7..  It may  be summarized that, 
according to the  Portugese Government,  the  main  reasons for the deviation between the plan 
and the result were higher prices for coils and other materials and the fact that a new evaluation 
led  to  a higher depreciation.  The  Portugese authorities  stressed  that of SN Longos and  SN 
Pianos  would  be  privatized  in  mid  1995,  so  that  it  may  be  expected  that  a  new  private 
management would  proceed to further financial restructuring measures rather soon.  It further 
pointed out that 17% of the aid approved under Article 95 ECSC have not been granted so far 
so  that there  is  still a certain  margin  to  cover unexpected costs,  such  as  due to the  delay  in 
reduction of workforce. 
1  COM (94) 420 final,  0  J  No.  L 112 of 3 May  1994, p.  52 
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Ill.  The new monitoring report 
The Portugese Government presented a full range of information in  line with the request of the 
Commission. 
1.  Capacity reductions 
The production of the light section mill and the continuous casting installations (Seixal) had 
been stopped by  31  October 1993.  During a visit of a representative of the Commission 
in  December 1994 it  had  been  verified that the mill has been  physically separated from 
the plant and that it was out of operation.  These measures provided the first part (60 ktly) 
of the total capacity reduction required (140 ktly).  Negotiations to sell the installations to 
a third country are still not completed. 
It is intended, in  line with  the Commission's decision and the restructuring plan,  to close 
down the medium section mill (Seixal) by  31  December 1995.  This measure would lead 
to a further capacity  reduction  by  80  ktly  thus  completing  the  total  capacity  reduction 
required. 
The intended  closure  of the  blast  furnace,  the  converter and  the  coking  plant may  be 
carried out after the installation of the electric arc furnace, which will be chosen by the new 
owner of SN  Longos after privatization. 
2.  Investments 
The  investment  programme  as  presented  in  the  second  monitoring  report  remains 
unchanged.  The management of the company decided not to carry out major investments 
until after privatization in  order not to  jeopardize the industrial  plans of the new owner. 
The possible impact of the 6 months delay of the entering into operation of the continuous 
casting installation in  Maia compared to the business plan may only be established after 
the  final  investment  plan  of the  future  owner would  be  available.  This  question  will 
therefore be discussed during the second half of 1995, given the privatization takes place 
as announced by the Portugese Government. 
During 1994, the company spend 386 mio Esc in small and  regular investments. 
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3.  Reduction of workforce 
Redundancies 
1993  1994  1995.  1996.  1997* 
early retirement  138  111  146  126 
releases  28  114  317  258 
other  27  20  0 
TOTAL reduction  193  245  463  384 
entries  0  7 
TOTAL net  193  238  463  384  520 
reduction 
previously reported  193  380  635  590  -
•  forecast 
Forecast of evolution of workforce 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
long products, of which 
in Seixa/  2070  2056  437  430  430  580 
in  Maia  478  429  400  380  380  380 
TOTAL long products  2548  2485  837  810  810  960 
flat products  660  530  474  440  440  440 
TOTAL  3208  3015  1311  1250  1250  1400 
SN  Services  - - 1431  1029  645  -
SN  SGPS  - - 35  35  35  10 
TOTALSN  3208  3015  2777  2314  1930  1410 
Reduction per year  193  238  463  384  520 
Total planned before  3208  2925  2380  1682  1410  1410 
Deviation from 
previous  + 90  + 397  + 635  + 520  +/- 0 
plan 
Deviation from plan as 
reported in previous  - + 90  + 255  + 318  +/- 0  +I- 0 
monitoring report 
It  shall  be  noted  that  the  current  forecast  for  the  evolution  of  workforce  deviates 
remarkably  from  the  previous  business  plan  (PERG)  submitted  by  the  Portugese 
Government.  The retention of 397 employees more in 1994, 635 employees more in 1995 
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and 520 employees more in  1996 would cause costs that were not expected when the 
business plan was drafted.  The new plan covering the evolution ·of workforce shows an 
even more costly picture than the plan presented in  the last monitoring report. 
The Commission has discussed its concerns as regards the possible negative impact of 
the delay in  the reduction of workforce with the Portugese a1,1thorities. 
The Portugese authorities explained that the  reasons for the delay are the fact that the 
Commission adopted its decision concerning the Article 95 ECSC later than expected, that 
the budget necessary to finance the redundancies were made available by the responsible 
Portugese administrations later than expected and that the difficult situation on the labour 
market in Portugal and in particular on the peninsula of Setubal turned it more difficult than 
expected to .achieve redundancies in mutual agreements. 
As regards the possible negative impact on  viability the Portugese authorities explained 
that: 
the total costs to be borne by the company under the revised plan would be approx. 
23%  lower (calculated in  prices of 1993) than  under the initial plan (PERG); 
the total additional costs caused by the delay would amount to 3.728 bn  Esc (19.2 
MECU); 
the  company  has  decided to reinforce  its  efforts to reduce workforce by  several 
measures, such as charging a special outplacement consultant, offering assistance 
to find professional alternatives for the former workers of SN, and certain measures 
in the framework of the RESIDER I and  II  programmes. 
The workers being retained in  deviation from the initial  plan PERG were assigned to SN 
SefYit;os so that the  two companies to be privatized would not have to carry  the related 
burden.  The additional costs to be borne by  SN SeiYit;os are expected to be covered by 
the  income  from  privatization  of the  two  companies  SN  Longos  and  SN  Pianos.  In 
addition, the Portugese authorities only granted 50 bn Esc of 60.12 bn Esc authorized by 
the Commission under Article 95 ECSC.  If necessary, the difference of 10.12 bn Esc may 
also be used  to cover additional costs  of SN SeiYit;os due to the  delay  in  reduction  of 
workforce. 
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Financing of redundancies 1993 and  1994 
year  nature  no of  56 ECSC  State(Art.  company•  TOTAL 
workers  56 ECSC) 
early ret  138  52.8  52.8  105.6 
1993  releases  28  17.1  17.1  8.3  42.5 
others  27  - - - -
TOTAL  193  69.9  69.9  8.3  148.1 
early ret.  111  43.6  43.6  0  87.2 
1994 
releases  114  67.3  67.3  245.0  379.6 
others  20  0  0  0  0 
TOTAL  245  110.9  110.9  245.0  466.8 
TOTAL  438  180.8  180.8  253.3  614.9 
costs in mio Esc 
• to which the States contributes up to 50% under Article 4.1  Steel Aids Code 
4.  Production 
Product  1993  1994 
Crude steel  745.3  722.7 
long products  709.9  700.9 
flat products  209.7  229.3 
Total finished products  919.6  930.2 
in kt 
Evolution of monthly production in  2.  half of 1994 
month  TOTAL 
product  1994 
JUL  AUG  SEP  OCT  NOV  DEC 
crude steel  73.3  66.5  70.7  68.7  64.5  69.5  413.2 
long products  68.3  64.8  62.0  64.4  64.3  58.2  382.0 
flat products  21.1  14.8  19.7  22.7  20.9  23.6  122.8 
Total finished products  89.4  79.6  81.7  87.1  85.2  81.8  504.8 
in kt 
- SN  page 5-
3,1 STEEL MONITORING REPORT No  3,  May  1995,  SIDERURGIA NACIONAL 
5.  Sales 
Evolution of sales and  markets 
1993  1994 
kt  %  kt  % 
Portugal  653  70  667.7  72.3 
EU  11  112  12  159.8  17.3 
3rd Countries  168  18  96.1  10.4 
TOTAL  933  100  923.6  100 
Sales in  1994 per product category 
Portugal  EU  11  3rd Countries  TOTAL 
long products  511.3  118.3  67.0  696.6 
flat products  156.4  41.5  29.1  227.0 
TOTAL  667.7  159.8  96.1  923.6 
Comparison of sales 1994 with plan 
1994  plan 1994 
kt  mio esc  kt  mio Esc 
Portugal  667.7  40515  712  41800 
long  5113  27583  559  29307 
flat  156.4  12932  153  12493 
other markets  255.9  15658  267  16541 
long  185.3  9436  180  9437 
flat  70.6  6222  87  7101 
TOTAL  923.6  56173  979*  58341 
• this figure show the plan fgure minus 27 kt light profiles because the light section mill was closed down by end 
Oct 1993 
The comparison between the sales reported and the forecasts of the business plan show 
a deviation of 6 % in quantities and  3.66 % income achieved.  The Portugese authorities 
also provided figures leading to the conclusion that a comparison between the saies of the 
second half of 1993 and the second half of 1994 shows an increase by  16% in quantities. 
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On  the basis of the information shown above  it may be  concluded that the developn:c:;nt 
of the second half of 1994 allowed the company to catch up with the remarkable deviation 
compared to  the business plan to be observed in the second monitoring report. 
The  Portugese Government also provided  detailed information concerning  pricing.  The 
Commission examined the information given and concluded that the prices are within the 
normal range. 
6.  Financial Performance 
The detailed figures concerning the financial performance of Siderurgia Nacional submitted 
by  the Portugese authorities show a remarkable improvement in the second half of 1994 
compared  to  the  first  half of 1994 as  well  as  during the entire year 1994  compared  to 
1993. 
The comparison  of the main financial data show an  increase in  turnover between 1993 
and 1994 of 17% and between the first half and the second half of 1994 of 27%.  The total 
costs  decreased  between  1993  and  1994  by  9.7%.  The  operating  result  increased 
between  1993 and  1994 by 59%,  the gross margin increased by  56%. 
The company,  however,  still falls  behind  the forecasts of the  business  plan.  The plan 
(PERG)  expected  a small  positive  operating  result  for 1994 of 47  mio  Esc,  while  the 
achieved  operating  result  in  1994  amounts  to  minus  10947  mio  Esc.  The  turnover 
expected in  the business plan was slightly  lower than achieved  but the total costs were 
some 19% higher than expected. 
The Portugese authorities explain in the monitoring report a number of reasons for these 
deviations: 
•  the costs for the purchase of coils and other 
material were higher than expected in the plan  5100mio Esc  51.7% 
•  the technical breakdown in Maia led to lower sales 
than expected  860mio Esc  8.7% 
•  the delay in reduction of  workforce  555 mio Esc  5.6% 
•  the plan used lower evaluations  for assets than 
finally established  by an independentexpe rt for the 
purpose of creating the initial balance sheets for 
the companies of the group so that the depreciation  3351  mio Esc  34% 
was higher  than expected 
TOTAL  9866mio Esc  100% 
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Taking these explanations into account.  the  deviation between the total costs estimated 
in  the plan  and  the  actual  costs  borne  in  1994  amount to  approx.  1200 mio  Esc (6.18 
MECU).  The deviation  in  costs  would  amount  to  + 2.05  % between  the  plan  and  the 
actual figures of 1994 when taking the explanations into account. 
However,  this  deviation has to  be  covered.  According to  the  Portugese authorities this 
would be the case if privatization takes place as intended.  If the announced privatization 
would not be carried out by  mid  1995 the deviation has to  be discussed with a view to a 
possible requirement of appropriate measures to be  taken  to  reinforce the restructuring 
measures. 
7.  Privatization 
Regarding  privatization,  the  Portugese Government informed  the  Commission  that  the 
creation of the  new corporate structure (SN SGPS,  Longos,  Pianos,  Servir;;os) has been 
completed  by  31  March  1994,  that the  formal  decision  to  privatize  SN  Longos and  SN 
Pianos  has been  adopted  in  August  1994 and  that the formal  invitation  for tender has 
been  published  in  December 1994.  It is  expected  to  finally  privatize both  companies in 
June  1995.  The  Portugese  authorities  stressed  that  the  Government  has  decided  to 
accelerate the privatization of SN Longos in order to reinforce the credibility of the financial 
restructuring of the company. 
The time table for the privatization provides for the evaluation of the industrial proposals 
received by  beginning of March  1995 until 20 April  1995.  The final purchase offers are 
expected to be received by  11  May 1995 and will be analysed until 5 June 1995.  The final 
decision of the Council of Ministers of Portugal to privatize the companies is expected for 
mid  June 1995. 
8.  Aid 
The Commission approved aids of up to 38 bn Esc (191.5 MECU) for capital injection and 
22.12  bn  Esc  (111  MECU)  for  debt  write-off under Article  95  ECSC.  The  Portugese 
Government informed the Commission that SN  received  until end of 1994 50 bn  Esc for 
its financial  restructuring.  This represents 83%  of the aid  approved  by  the  Commission 
under Article 95 ECSC. 
The approved aid under Article 3 of the Steel Aid Code (environmental aid) has not been 
paid so far.  The use of the approved aid under Article 4 (1) of the Steel Aid Code is being 
explained above under 111.3 .. 
As regards the Carti de Conforto the Commission has examined whether they have been 
replaced  by  other  aid  after their  termination.  The  Portugese  authorities  informed  the 
Commission that all Carli de Conforto have been terminated together with the related loan 
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contracts except three covering ECSC loans totalling 21.9 bn Esc.  They were, accOI,;tng 
to  the Portugese authorities,  not replaced by other guarantees. 
9.  Minimum net financial charges 
In  its  decision  to  authorise  State  aid  in  favour of Siderurgia  Nacional the  Commission 
included, similar to the other Article 95 ECSC decisions, the provision that the "level of net 
financial charges of the new company at the outset will  be set at least at 3.5% of annual 
turnover. 
The  Portuguese  authorities  understood  the  "new  company"  to  be  SN  SGPS  as  the 
successor of Siderurgia Nacional  S.A. and reported the net financial charges of the entire 
new structure of enterprises with SN SGPS (holding) and SN Longos,  SN Pianos and SN 
Servit;os as to  be at around  16% of turnover. 
During  discussions concerning  details of the  privatisation  of SN Longos and  SN Pianos 
it has been discovered  that the net financial charges of these  two operating  companies 
were at the outset in April  1994 set at only.± 1% of annual turnover. 
In the Commissions' view, since the sense of the provision is to avoid an undue advantage 
of the aided companies at the production level compared to its competition, the fulfilment 
of this provision shall not only cover the  holding/group (which is formally  covered  by  the 
decision itself)  but also the single operating companies that are active on  the  market. 
The  Portugese  authorites  argued  that  the  net  financial  charges  of the  two  operating 
companies  earmarked  for  privatization  are  kept  low  with  a  view  to  the  necessary 
investments to  be  carried  out  under the  restructuring  plan  after privatization.  With  the 
beginning of the first investments the financial charges would  reach the level of 3.5 %of 
turnover rather soon,  without any additional aid. 
The argumentation of the  Portugese authorities appears similar to those of .the  German 
Government concerning  the condition  of minimum  net  financial  charges  in  the  case  of 
SEW Freital.  In this case the implementation of the necessary investments to implement 
the  industrial  restructuring  were  a  contractual  obligation  of the  purchaser  and  were 
compared  to  a  financial  burden  similar  to  financial  charges  which  may,  however,  not 
appear in the accounting of the company. 
A similar approach  in  the  present  case  would  lead  to  the  necessity  of including  strict 
contractual  obligations  to  carry  out  certain  investments  necessary  to  implement  the 
industrial  restructuring  within  a  certain  time  limit  in  the  privatization  contracts  to  be 
concluded by the Portugese Government covering the sale of SN Longos and SN Pianos. 
This question will be discussed with the Portugese authorities during the coming months. 
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Monitoring of Article 95 ECSC steel aid cases 
Third Report, May 1995 
EKO Stahl GmbH, Germany 
The Commission approved in Apri11994 up to OM 813 million (ECU 444 million) aid to back the 
privatization  and  restructuring  plan  for  EKO  Stahl AG  under participation  of the  Italian  Riva 
group111.  In May 1994, the Riva group withdrew from the privatization contract. 
On 6 July  1994,  the Commission decided to initiate a procedure pursuant to Article 6 (4)  of the 
Steel Aids Codem with regard to the continuous loss financing  in favour of EKO Stahl GmbH ( 31 
by  the public holding  Treuhandanstalt (hereinafter referred to as 'the THA') and  an  investment 
loan granted by  a public bank.  It held  that these transfers of financial  ressources from  public 
entities to the steel undertaking may represent State aid incompatible with the Steel Aids Code. 
On 27 July 1994, the Commission decided to initiate an second procedure under Article 6 (4) of 
the  Steel  Aids  Code(41  with  regard  to  a  notification  of the  German  authorities  received  on 
29 June 1994 covering investment aid under general regional investment aid schemes of up to 
OM  300  million (ECU 164 million).  The Commission was of the opinion that such aid,  although 
it may in general be deemed compatible with the common market under Article 5 indent 3 of the 
Steel Aids Code, would not serve towards the aims of the Treaty if it would not be accompanied 
by  a restructuring plan  providing for the proper financing of the entire industrial restructuring of 
the company in question. 
On  10 October 1994, the German authorities notified a new privatization and restructuring plan, 
providing  for  the  sale  of 60%  of the  shares  to  the  Belgian  Cockerill  Sambre  S.A..  On 
8 December 1994 the Council gave its unanimous assent to State aid connected to  this plad51• 
On  21  December 1994,  the Commission adopted its final decision(61  authorizing State aid of up 
to  OM 900.62 million (ECU 492 million), of which OM  362.2 million (ECU 198.1  million) to cover 
losses accumulated  until  the end  of 1994,  up  to  OM  220  million  (ECU  120.2 million)  to  cover 
losses during the restructuring period 1995-1997, up to  OM 314 million (ECU 171.6 million) to 
cover costs of investments and  repairs and a guarantee of the public THA representing an  aid 
element of up to  OM  4.02 million (ECU  2.2 million).  Since EKO Stahl GmbH has no own hot-
rolling  capacities,  the Commission accepted  the  closure of a hot-rolling  mill  of Hennigsdorfer 
Elektrostahlwerke GmbH (Brandenburg) with a capacity of 320 ktly and of another hot-rolling mill 
with a capacity of 41  ktty of Watzwerke Burg GmbH (Brandenburg)  as  sufficient to  reduce the 
PJ  see Commission decision of 12.4.1994, O.J.  No  L 112 of 3.5.1994,  p.  48 
<21  State aid  No C 29/94 ex  NN  52/94,  see O.J.  No C 274 of 1.10.1994, p.  3 
<
31  On  17.6.1994 the corporate form of EKO Stahl has been changed from Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 
into Gesel/schaft mit beschrankter Haftung (GmbH) 
141  State aid  No  C 35/94 ex  N 397/94,  see O.J.  No C 303 of 29.10.1994,  p.  4 
151  see O.J.  No C 360 of 17.12.1994, p.  12 
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distortive effect of the aid approved.  The creation of a new hot-rolling mill with a capacity o,  ::JUO 
kt/y (limited at this capacity for a period of five years) by EKO Stahl GmbH shall be balanced by 
capacity reductions in  hot-rolled finished  products elsewhere in  the territory of the former GDR 
The Commission introduced the same provisions as in its Decision of April1994 concerning the 
monitoring of the implementation of its Decision. 
Also on 21  December, the Commission authorized investment aid  in favour of EKO Stahl GmbH 
of up to  OM  385  million  (ECU  210.4  million)  under general  regional  investment aid  schemes, 
applying Article 5 indent 3 of the Steel Aids Code(7l.  The procedure initiated on 27 July 1994 has 
been closed 18). 
II.  The first monitoring report covering the situation as  by the end  of 1994 
On 10 March 1995, the German authorities submitted the first report in the monitoring procedure 
covering the new restructruing and privatization plan under participation of Cockerill Sambre S.A.. 
The purpose of this report is to draw a picture of the companies situation at the end of 1994, i.e. 
immediately before its 60% privatization, and to explain the first measures taken  by the German 
authorities on  the basis of the Commission's decision of 21  December 1994. 
1.  Capacity reduction 
The Commission decided that a hot-rolling mill of Hennigsdorfer Elektrostahlwerke GmbH 
with a capacity of 320 kt/y and a hot-rolling mill of Walzwerke Burg GmbH shall be closed 
down by 31  January 1995 to reduce the distortive effect of the aid authorized under Article 
95  of the  ECSC  Treaty.  In  the  report  dated  8  March  1995,  the  German authorities 
informed the Commission that the closure of both installations had been  implemented by 
the end of January. 
2.  Investments 
Until the end of 1994,  EKO Stahl GmbH carried out investments in the modernization of 
the cold-rolling mill totalling  OM  200  million  (ECU  109.3 million) which were financed  by 
an  investment  loan  granted  by  a  banks  consortium.  The  consortium  terminated  its 
17
)  State aid  No N 728/94,  not published in the O.J.  so  far,  see IP (94) 1275 
181  In  1995, the Commission adopted a final decision  concerning  EKO  Stahl GmbH: On 1.3.1995 
it decided to terminate the Article 6 (4) Steel Aids Code procedure, State aid No C 29/94 ex NN 
52/94.  It concluded that the shareholders' loans of THA were partly covered  by  the Article 95 
ECSC decision.  The remaining part of 90 OM (49.2 ECU) would be granted as a new loan under 
market conditions.  The Commission further concluded that the investment loan , granted not only 
by  a public bank but by  a consortium including private banks,  did  not represent State aid  (not 
published in  the O.J. so  far,  see IP (95)  194). 
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financing  by  the  beginning of 1995 and the loan is now being  granted by a private bank 
(Dresdenr Bank) under market conditions.  30  %of this loan  (OM 60 million,  ECU  32  .8 
million)  are  being  covered  by  a  guarantee  of THNBVS<
9
l,  in  line  with  Article  1 of the 
Commission's decision under Article4 95  ECSC of 21  December 1994. 
The investment plan  for the coming years  in shown  in the following table: 
(in Mio DM)  1995  1996  1997  TOTAL 
modernizationof sinter facilities  1  27  11  39 
construction of blast furnace  28  141  113  282 
new hot-rolling mill  70  275  326  671 
modernizationcold-rolhngmill 
(remaining works)  51  57  0  181 
TOTAL  150  500  450  1100 
3.  Reduction of workforce 
On  1 January  1995 EKO  Stahl GmbH had 2933 employees,  some  100 less than at the 
beginning of 1994. 
4.  Production, sales per product, turnover 
1994 
Finished  product  production  in kt  sales in kt  turnover  in Mio OM 
pig iron  1071.4  2.7  0.9 
slabs  1211.7  749.4  285.2 
cold strip  49.2  53.4  32.4 
fine plates cold-rolled  602.4  603.6  439.2 
magnetic steel sheets  27.6  26.4  20.4 
fine plate galvanized  223.2  236.4  196.8 
fine plate coated  72.0  75.6  85.2 
Subtotal finished 
products  974.4  995.4  774.0 
TOTAL  3257.5  1747.5  1060.1* 
• The total turnover of OM  1092 million includes miscellaneous income of OM 32.1  million. 
'
91  THA has formally  been closed by  the end  of 1994.  The new body  acting as  a holding for the 
shares in  EKO Stahl GmbH is the Betei/igungs-Management-Gesel/schaft Berlin mbH (BMGB) 
controlled by the Federal Republic of Germany.  The new body being responsible for the financial 
contributions agreed  by  THA and  for  the  supervision of the  implementation of the  contract is 
Bundesanstalt fOr vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben (BVS). 
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5.  Sales and markets 
Finished  products 1994 
in Mio DM  I. quarter  11. quarter  111. quarter  IV. quarter  1994 total 
Germany  113  135  144  143  535 
- EU  37.8  55.5  58.4  65.4  217.1 
-CIS  1.5  0.7  0  0  2.2 
- Eastern Eur.  1.6  2.8  3.6  3.7  11.7 
- other countr.  2.7  1.4  2.3  1.6  8.0 
Export total  43.6  60.4  64.3  70.7  239.0 
TOTAL  156.6  195.4  208.3  213.7  774 
Comparison  1994 - 1993 including non-finished products 
in Mio OM  1993  1994  1994 compared to 1993 in % 
Germany  641.2  707 02  + 10.26% 
Export'  370.4  353.08  • 4.67% 
TOTAL  1011.6  1060.1  + 4.79% 
• slabs only exported to the USA (40%), the ren~aindersold in Germany. 
The  average  prices  of  the  product  groups  were  given  in  the  monitoring  report.  The 
Commission  compared  these  prices  with  the  average  market  prices  achieved  and 
considers them to be within the normal range. 
6.  Financial Performance 
Compared to 1993 EKO Stahl GmbH reduced its losses in  1994 by 53% down to  OM  86 
million (ECU 47 million) net and increased its turnover by 8% up to OM  1092 million (ECU 
597  million).  A  certain  part  of this  positive  development  may  be  due  to  the  general 
recovery  of the  European  steel  market during  the last months of 1994.  However,  this 
development of the  market also  caused higher costs for EKO Stahl GmbH to  purchase 
coils or to charge other producer for hire-rolling. 
7.  Privatization 
The privatization contract between  Cockerill Sambre S.A.  and  THA has been  concluded 
on  22  December 1994.  The German Government provided a copy of the contract.  The 
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contract,  providing for the sale of 60%  of the shares of EKO Stahl GmbH to the Belgian 
steel company,  will enter into force retroactive once all conditions are met.  At the time of 
drafting  of this  report,  only  one  condition,  the  agreement  of the  Belgian  Conseil  de 
Concurrence was outstanding. 
8.  Aid 
a)  ·  Aid  in  line with decision Art 95  ECSC 
The  Commission  authorized  the  following  aids  in  its  Article  95  decision  of  21 
December 1994: 
compensation of losses accumulated since 1 July 1990 until the privatization 
of the company of OM  362.6  million, 
compensation of future losses during the restructuring phase until the end of 
1997 of OM  220 million maximum, 
investment aid (beyond of what may already be deemed compatible with the 
common  market  according  to  Article  5  indent  3  of  Decision  No 
3855/91/ECSC) of OM 275 million, 
contribution to cover costs of repairs of OM  39 million, 
a  guarantee  granted  by  the  Treuhandanstalt  covering  a  OM  60  million 
investment  loan  granted  by  a  consortium  of  private  and  public  banks, 
representing an  aid  element of OM  4.02  million maximum. 
The German Government informed the Commission that 
the THA has waived OM  362.6  million  debts based on  loans granted before 
privatization, 
the THA has paid  OM  220 million on an  account of EKO Stahl GmbH on 29 
December 1994 to cover future  losses during the restructuring period, 
the THA has paid  OM  275 million on an account of EKO Stahl GmbH on  29 
December 1994 for investments to  be carried out under the plan, 
the THA has paid  OM  39  million on  an  account of EKO Stahl GmbH on  29 
December 1994 for repairs and  maintenance, 
that  THA has  granted  a  guarantee  covering  DM  60  million  of  a  DM  200 
million investment loan  granted by a single private bank (see above 11.2.). 
THA charged  an  independent chartered  accountant to  supervise  the  use  of the 
contributions  in  line  with  the  contractual  obligations.  The  obligations  under  the 
Decision of the Commission were made part of the contract. 
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It may therefore be concluded that the aid authorized by the Commission has been 
paid before the end of 1994. 
b)  Aid in line with the Commission decision to allow investment aid 
under general regional investment aid schemes 
On 21  December 1994 the Commission decided to authorize up  to  OM  385 million 
investment aid  under general regional inve::;tment aid  schemes,  applying  Article 5 
indent 3 of the Steel Aids Code (see above 1.).  The German authorities informed 
the Commission that the Land Brandenburg has paid  OM 380 million on an account 
at Investment Bank of Brandenburg for  EKO Stahl GmbH.  The remainder of OM 
5 million is being granted in  form  of a tax reduction which became effective by  the 
end of 1994.  It may be  concluded that the regional aid  has  been  paid by  the end 
of 1994. 
c)  No further aid 
EKO  Stahl GmbH has  received  a  OM  90  million  (ECU  49.2  million)  loan  from 
THA/BVS  in  line with  the  privatization  contract.  This  loan  is  being  granted  for a 
period of maximum three years but will be terminated if Cockerill Sambre S.A. takes 
over the remaining 40% share earlier than  by the end of 1997.  30% of this loan are 
being  covered  by  a  bank  guarantee  provided  by  Cockerill  Sambre  S.A..  The 
interest rate charged for this loan is 7. 7%.  It is to be assessed whether this interest 
rate meets normal market conditions.  The private Dresdner Bank granted a OM 200 
million investment loan for the same interest rate and for the same period, of which 
30% are covered by a 30% guarantee of THA/BVS.  Therefore, it may be concluded 
that the conditions of the  loan granted  by  the  public  THA/BVS correspond  to  the 
conditions of the loan granted by  a private bank. 
9.  Other conditions 
In its Decision under Arti.cle 95 ECSC the Commission imposed the condition that the level 
of net financial charges of EKO Stahl GmbH will be set at least at 3.5% of annual turnover 
at the date of its 60% privatization. 
In  the  monitoring  report the  German authorities explain  that the  net financial charges at 
the  time  of privatization  were  at  a level  of 3.82  % of  turnover.  The  turnover is  being 
calculated  excluding  the  sui~"  of  slabs  which  are  considered  to  be  irregular  for  an 
integrated producer, for which the average of 3.5% minimum financial charges has been 
calculated.  This is  the main obstacle for the company's viablility because the necessary 
hire-rolling or selling of slabs/purchase of coils costs  some  1  00  OM  per ton  finished  flat 
product.  The restructuring plan provides for the  filling of this technological gap. 
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The  fact  that  EKO  Stahl  GmbH does  not  have  own  hot-rolling  capacities  would  not 
influence its turnover if the  company would let own slabs exclusively be  treated by  hire-
rolling.  This possibility would  create costs for the work carried out by  another company 
on  goods that would not be  sold  by  EKO Stahl GmbH at this  stage.  It would  not create 
turnover in  terms of price received for the selling of goods. 
Another possibility, with the same "technical outcome", is to sell slabs and buy coils on the 
market.  This alternative leads to an additional turnover appearing in the books, which may 
be  considered to  be  "artificial"  because it  has  nothing  to  do  with the  real  nature  of the 
business carried  out.  EKO Stahfs intention  is  not to  be  a slab  supplier but to  produce 
finished  products. 
The company has  not the  free choice  between the two possibilities because hire-rolling 
capacities  are  not  available on  the  market to  a sufficient extent  Since the  demand for 
steel increases and producers may use their capacities for own business, the competitors 
of EKO Stahl do not offer sufficient hire-rolling possibilities to cover the entire need of the 
company. 
The German Government is of the opinion that the "artificial" turnover created by  the sale 
of slabs shall not be  counted when calculating the net financial charges in  percentage of 
annual turnover.  The turnover would  normally be calculated on  the  basis of the income 
of the  company through  the  sale of its finished products (tonnage times price) plus other 
income.  The sale of slabs in the middle of the production flow creates additional turnover 
because the  income has  to  be  counted  for  the  entire business income of the  company. 
The  fact  that  this  income  is  completely  balanced  by  the  costs  to  buy  slabs  has  no 
influence on  the  accounting concerning turnover.  This turnover would not be  typical for 
integrated producers so that an equal treatment would call for a correction of the turnover 
figures in light of the particular situation of EKO Stahl GmbH. 
Applying  this  position  of  the  German  Government,  the  annual  turnover  of  EKO  Stahl 
GmbH amounts  to  OM  806  million,  the  net  financial  charges  as  a percentage  of this 
turnover total 3.82%.  If the turnover through the sale of slabs would not be excluded from 
the annual turnover figure, the turnover would amount to OM  1092 million, the level of net 
financial charges would  be  2.82% only. 
The Commission  is  of the  opinion  that  the  argumentation  of  the  German  Government 
should be  considered by  the Council. 
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I.  Introduction 
Monitoring of Article 95 ECSC steel aid cas,es 
Third Report, May 1995 
SEW Freital GmbH, Germany 
The Commission decided on  12 April 1994 to  approve  aids totalling  274 Mia OM  in  favour of 
Sachsische Edelstahlwerke GmbH, Freitai/Sachsen under Article 95  ECSC Treaty1
1l. 
The present report covers some outstanding questions from the previous monitoring report which 
had been  made subject of some additional  investigations and  which were discussed with the 
German Government in the meantime and the information provided by the German Government 
in  its third monitoring report,  which was submitted on  15 March 1995. 
II.  Outstanding questions from the previous monitoring report 
In its monitoring reports covering the  period up until mid  1994,  the  Commission identified two 
issues of concern regarding  SEW Freital: 
1.  Presumed excess aid 
In  its last monitoring reports the Commission concluded,  on  the basis of tile information 
provided by the German Government, that SEW  Freital had received a total amount of OM 
200 million loss compensation, while only 189 Mio OM were approved by the Commission. 
The German authorities presented a detailed explanation  proposing that OM  6.1  million 
of the  loss  compensation  should  not be  regarded  as  part  of the  OM  189  million  ioss 
compensation authorized but as  part of the maximum OM  9 Mio guarantee covering the 
value of the  stocks and  claims and  claiming that the  remainder of OM  4.9 million would 
represent  the  purchase· price  for  some land  sales  from  the  company  to  TLG,  the  real 
estate management body of THA'21 
In Februa1y 1995 the Commission carried out an  in depth investigation to verify the factual 
background of tile argumentation of the  German authorities.  During this investigation it 
was detected that, contrary to the first two reports provided by  the German Government, 
the company did not receive OM  200 million loss compensation.  In fact, THA waived OM 
53  million claims based on  a liquidity  loan granted  before  privatization and covered OM 
111  COM (94) 451  final,  O.J.  No.  L 1121 of 3 May 1994,  p.  71 
121  see second monitoring report of  1.11.1994, Annex 7.  11.1.. STEEL MONITORING REPORT No  3,  May  1995,  SEW Freital 
55 million debts vis-a-vis suppliers.  Furthermore, it took over claims totalling OM 92 million 
from  banks with the result that THA is now creditor vis-a-vis SEW Freital.  This claim has 
not formally been waived so far.  As regards a portion of OM 81  million of this claim it may 
be  considered  to  de  facto  granted  as  aid  because  the  company  may,  based  on  the 
decision  of the Commission,  trust  that THA would  not  sue it on  the basis of this claim. 
The remainder of OM  11  million may, however, still be considered to represent a valuable 
claim of THA/BVS vis-a-vis the company. 
As  regards the proposal of the German authorities to allow the waiving of OM  6. 1 million 
od  these debts as part of the  maximum  OM  9 million  guarantee the  investigation of the 
Commission led to  the  conclusion that:  The company had very  little  stocks in  alloys in 
November/December  1992  and  had  to  buy  important  quantities  to  ensure  its  further 
production.  Only  between  19  November and  18 December 1992,  the  management (the 
later purchaser)  bought vanadium,  chrom  and  molybden  for  OM  8.071  million  with  the 
result  that the  value of the  stock and  the  amount of debts increased accordingly.  The 
company  disclosed all  relevant documents  and  proved  that the  purchase price  had  not 
been paid at the end of 1992.  The difference between the guaranteed value of the stock 
and  the  final  real  value  of the  stock was  thereby  limited  to  OM  2.9  million  so  that the 
guarantee covering a maximum difference of OM 9 Mia million was not used for an amount 
of OM  6.1  million. 
It can  therefore be  concluded that the waivin of OM  6.1  million is equivalent to aid of the 
same  amount that could  have been  granted  under form  of the  maximum  OM  9 million 
guarantee authorized by  the  Commission. 
As  regards  the  land  sales  from  SEW Freital to  TLG,  the  Commission  carried  out  an 
investigation into  the evaluation  of the  sites in  question.  TLG  charged,  in  line  with  its 
internal  rules,  idenpendent experts  to  assess the  market value  of the  land.  The exJ:ert 
evaluations have been presented to  the  representative of the  Commission.  The market 
value of all sites subject to te agreement established by the independent experts totals OM 
7. 7 million, not taking into account certain restitution problems.  TLG and the company are 
currently  negotiating  to  establish  the  final  purchase  price.  According  to  the  German 
Goivernment it  will  not  be  lower than  OM  5 million.  Once the  purchase  price  is  being 
finally established, the related claim of the company will be set-off against a part of the OM 
92  million claim of BVS  referred  to above.  BVS would thereby pay the price for the real 
estate. 
It may be  concluded that the purchase price to be paid through the set-off against claims 
of BVS would  not constitute State aid  because it  would  only  represent the  market value 
of real  estate  being  transferred  from  the  company  to  BVS.  The procedure  of TLG  to 
charge independent experts to evaluate the sites corresponds to  the general policy of the 
Commission concerning land purchase agreements.  The issue will closely be followed by 
the Commission until the transactions are terminated. 
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2.  Minimum net financial charges 
In its first monitoring report the Commission concluded that the company did not comply 
with the condition that it shall have minimum net financial charges of 3. 5%  at the time of 
privatization.  The argumentation of the German Government, as  reported  in  the second 
monitoring report of the Commission131, was that the company has been privatized before 
the  Commission  has  adopted  its  final  decision  and  that  the  provision  has  not  been 
expected at that time.  It pointed  out that the  investor is under contractual  obligation  to 
carry out investments totalling OM  170 million (of an investment programme totalling  OM 
250 million) according to a strict time table.  It is of the opinion that this obligation may be 
considered to represent a burden comparable to financial charges although not appearing 
in the  balance sheet of the company.  In addition,  it pointed out that the company would 
take  in  an  investment  loan  by  the  end  of 1994 which  would  lead  to  financial  charges 
exceeding the requested  level of 3.5% of turnover by far. 
In the new monitoring report, the German Government explained that the company did not 
manage to  take  in  the  expected  investment loan  until  the  end  of  1994.  The  financial 
charges borne by SEW  Freital in 1994 amount to OM 5.822 million, which represent 5.5% 
of the turnover of that year. 
It is expected to take in a first tranch of the investment totalling  OM 65 million during the 
first  months  of 1995,  so  that  the  financial  charges  of  the  company  would  increase 
remarkably. 
Ill.  The new monitoring report 
1.  Capacity reduction 
The company closed and dismantled the medium section mill with  a capacity of 170 kUy 
by 30 June 1994, as stated in the previous monitoring report.  It is intended to close down 
the  remaining  light  section  mill  with  a  capacity  of  BO  kUy  by  the  end  of 1995.  The 
remaining electric arc furnace will be closed down during the first half of 1996. 
13
'  see  monitoring report of 1.11.1994, Annex 7,  11.2. 
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2.  Investments' 
The following  investments have been carried out until the end  of 1994: 
installation  MioDM 
crude steel facilities(Freital)  15.228 
rolling and forging facilities{Freital)  71.542 
re-heating and adjusting installations  16.426 
environment, infrastructure,administrationand 
marketing (Freital)  19.043 
polished steel installations,peel ing and abrading 
installations(Lugau)  12.540 
drawn wire installations(Lugau)  2.943 
environment, infrastructure,administrationand 
marketing (Lugau)  5.503 
TOTAL  143.225 
TOTAL planned 1993/94  167.000 
3.  Reduction of workforce 
The company carried out the following  redundancies: 
1993  1994  total  planned 
no of redundancies  990  45  1035  1060 
total costs in thou send DM  8776  468  9244  34000 
covered by 
THA  7571  85  7656 
56 ECSC  1164  144  1308 
company  41  239  280 
The  Commission  approved  a maximum  of  OM  34  million  aid  of THA to  cover costs  of 
redundancies.  This amount would have covered the entire costs of lay-offs in case other 
sources  for  financing  would  not have  been  available.  The information  shows  that  the 
company  carried  out the  reduction  of workforce  mainly  in  line with  the  plan.  The total 
reduction  achieved  by  the  end  of  1994  is  only  2.3%  lower  than  planned  and  was 
remarkably  cheaper than expected. 
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4.  Production and Sales 
1994 
product  (f1gures in tons)  production  sales  in Germany  otherEU  3rd cou ntrles 
ingots  37098  10514  10514  0  0 
semi-finishedproducts  31357  6542  4121  2181  240 
merchant bars, wire rod  12735  10687  6740  3550  379 
forged pieces  4398  3665  2460  1085  120 
polished stee I drawn (  Lugau)  7108  5990  4190  1620  180 
Compared to 1993 the company increased its sales by 65%. 
The  average  prices  of the  product  groups  were  given  in  the  monitoring  report.  The 
Commission  compared  these  prices  with  the  average  market  prices  achieved  and 
considers them to be within the normal range. 
5.  Financial Performance 
The  German  Government  presented  a  full  range  of  financial  figures  and  ratios  as 
requested  by  the  Commission.  The  figures  concerning  turnover  and  losses  show  a 
remarkable improvement of the situation of the company: 
inMioDM  1993  1. half 1994  1994  compared to 
1993in% 
turnover  70.5  42.36  105.68  + 49.9 
losses  11.85  3.57  5.46  -53.9% 
ratio net profit/ turnover  - 0.168  0.084  -0.051 
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